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Abstract 
This thesis aims at investigating and comparing financial changes in private equity owned 
companies to non-private equity owned companies. We have done this by selecting 25 
companies that have been exited by a private equity firm between 2004 and 2012 and 
compared changes in growth, profitability and efficiency during the holding period to a 
number of comparable companies. We found that private equity owned companies increased 
their profitability and growth more than comparable companies during the holding period, but 
there were no evidence of a similar superior increase in efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
The private equity (PE) industry has expanded rapidly across the Western world since it rose 
to prominence in the United States in the early 80s. The spread of private equity has been 
particularly noticeable in Sweden, where in 2012 private equity buyout investments amounted 
to more than 0,5 % of GDP, which is the highest number in Europe (EVCA 2013). The same 
year, 28 billion euro was invested in European companies by private equity funds and a total 
of 16,5 billion euro was raised in new funds throughout the year. Despite the impressive 
absolute numbers, this represents a 19 % drop in total investments and 39 % less capital raised 
in new funds compared to last year, reflecting the very strong performance of the private 
equity industry in 2011 (EVCA 2013). 
The European private equity industry experienced a boom from 2002 until the financial 
crisis of 2008, with a compounded average growth rate of 44 % in capital raised and 26 % in 
capital invested between 2002 and 2006 (EVCA 2013). Following the financial crisis, private 
equity fund raising and investing fell substantially, although the industry has recovered during 
the last three years. The private equity industry currently seems to be going in to a new phase 
with both regulatory changes and lower deal activity. This could possibly result in 
considerable changes of the industry in the coming years.  
1.2. Real Economic Growth 
Concurrent with the growing importance of the private equity industry, it has come under 
much scrutiny. A recurring critique is that private equity firms do not contribute with any real 
economic growth and that their debt financed acquisitions (so called “leveraged buyouts”) 
endangers the companies they acquire due to the heavy debt burden laid upon them. They 
have also been accused for stripping important assets of their portfolio companies in order to 
realize short term profits (The Economist, 2007). 
Advocates of the private equity industry claim that the critique is unjustified and point 
to the fact that private equity firms often invest in companies that experience difficulties and 
therefore might otherwise go bankrupt. They also point to the fact that their experience from 
other portfolio companies enables them to create sustainable improvements and real economic 
growth (KPMG, 2013). 
The Swedish Research Institute of Industrial Economics conducted a study in 2010 
evaluating the effects of private equity buyouts and found that there were evident productivity 
gains associated with the buyout. The study also found that employment fell marginally in the 
short term, but that there were no consistent evidences of reduced investments in the long 
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term. In a concluding remark, the report states that “the concerns of industry critics seem 
unwarranted” (IFN, 2010).  
1.3. Empirical results  
Several articles and theses have examined the return of private equity investments as an asset 
class compared to benchmark indexes and outlined the reasons behind potentially superior 
return (Aigner et.al. 2008). There have also been studies examining the rationale behind 
superior performance of private equity owned firms drawing upon well-established theories 
including agency theory, stewardship theory, operational improvements etc. (Braun et.al. 
2010).  However, as far as we know there are no studies that compare interpretable financial 
metrics at the year of the buyout and at the exit year.  
Hence, our aim with this thesis is to examine and evaluate what happens to the buyout 
firm during the time it is owned by the private equity firm. We will try to evaluate this by 
comparing certain financial metrics before and after the holding period. In order for these 
metrics to have an interpretable value, we have also decided that these metric should be 
compared to the same metrics of comparable companies not owned by PE firms. 
1.4. Delimitations and Formulation of Thesis Question 
The private equity industry is well known for being secretive and private equity firms do 
seldom release information concerning the performance of their portfolio companies. This 
was something we took under consideration when deciding what question formulation would 
underlie our thesis. In addition to this, we also examined what had already been written about 
the private equity industry.  
Since our task is to evaluate and compare performance between private equity firms and 
comparable companies, we formulated the following thesis question: 
 
How do companies owned by a private equity firm develop financially compared to non-
private equity owned comparable companies? 
 
We believe this question to be relevant when analyzing the changes in a company owned by a 
private equity firm. We hope our thesis will contribute to a more tangible understanding of 
what a company can expect when owned by a PE firm compared to not being owned by a PE 
firm. 
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2. Theory 
 
In this section, we give an introduction to the PE industry and its main characteristics. We 
also outline plausible theoretical explanations for the difference in performance between PE 
owned firms and publicly traded firms. 
2.1. What is Private Equity? 
The general distinction made between private equity and non-private equity is that private 
equity refers to an investment in a company that is not traded on a stock exchange (Sampson, 
2007).  However, this definition does not tell you how to consider a private investment in 
public equity (PIPE), which is common practice within the private equity industry, and is 
therefore somewhat simplistic. Despite its shortcoming and due to the basic nature of this 
paper, it will be the definition used throughout. 
A private equity transaction occurs when a private equity firm acquires either a private 
or public company, using a PE fund as the acquisition vehicle. The transaction is financed by 
using a relatively small amount of equity and a relatively large amount of debt (Sahlman, 
1990). This transaction is often referred to as a leveraged buyout (LBO). In the typical 
leverage buyout transaction, the PE fund acquires all shares in an existing and mature 
company. The larger size of the acquired company (henceforth referred to as “target 
company”) makes PE investments different from venture capital investments and the 
complete ownership takeover is due to the PE firm’s desire to strongly influence and develop 
the target company’s operations (Strömberg and Kaplan, 2008) 
The PE fund consists of two participants, Limited Partners (LP) and General Partners 
(GP). The General Partner is the PE firm itself, whereas Limited Partners are pension funds, 
insurance companies, wealthy individuals and similar who want the PE firm to invest their 
capital when conducting acquisitions. Each Limited Partner commits a certain amount of 
capital to the PE fund set up by the PE firm and their investment is legally seen as a limited 
partnership, which is why the investor is called a Limited Partner. The PE firm will raise a 
predetermined amount of capital and close the fund when the target is reached. It is customary 
that the General Partner invests 1 % of the total capital in the fund (Strömberg and Kaplan, 
2008) and the lifespan of a PE fund is usually around 10 years. Since the individual target 
company is owned between three and five years, it is unusual for the PE firm to acquire any 
company five years or later after inception (Strömberg and Kaplan, 2008). The number of 
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acquisitions made during the life span of the PE fund varies but is far less than that made by a 
normal mutual fund. 
Due to the limited partnership structure of PE funds only General Partners take 
decisions regarding what companies to acquire. Normally, the LP does not have any mandates 
whatsoever when it comes to investment decisions. The relationship between the LP and the 
GP is stated in a contract agreed on at a time before the first investment. This contract also 
includes certain covenants, for example how large an investment can be and how much debt 
the PE firm can use in an acquisition. Other covenants include what kind of securities can be 
invested in within the fund.  
The PE firm normally has three different sources of income from the PE fund (Berg and 
Gottschalg, 2003). First, the general partner earns a management fee that resembles the fee 
charged by mutual funds based on the amount of capital invested per year, and this fee 
constitutes the most predictable cash flow stream for the PE firm. Secondly, PE firms usually 
have a part that is based on the fund’s performance. This source of income constitutes the lion 
share of the return to the PE firm from a successful fund. Industry standard for the 
performance fee is 20 % and the fee is often referred to as “carried interest” (Sampson, 2007). 
Thirdly, some PE funds have so called “deal fees” or “monitoring fees” for the companies 
they invest in, but these will vary and might look very different from fund to fund (for further 
reading on fund charges, see Metric and Yasuda, 2007)  
The private equity industry is today mainly based in the United States and according to 
Private Equity International (PEI), 21 of the 30 largest PE firms in the world are based in the 
U.S. The 18 biggest PE firms all have more than 10 billion USD in assets under management 
and 17 of them are U.S. based (PEI 2013).  
2.2. Agency theory and Corporate Governance 
The Agency theory has been the most common explanation for the potentially superior return 
realized by companies owned by a PE firm. The Agency theory´s underlying argument is that 
the principle (owner, board) and the agent (CEO, management) of a company are in conflict 
regarding their own interests and that this conflict can be eliminated when the company is 
managed by a PE firm.  
The agency cost arises mainly because of two human factors; moral hazard and conflict 
of interest (Bebchuk et.al. 2004).  Moral hazard refers to a situation where it is possible for an 
individual to take on risk without having to deal with the (negative) consequences. An 
example of how this work can be found when looking at the history of the banking industry. 
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There has been close to a hundred bank crises during the last 20 years and nearly all have 
ended with taxpayers bailing out the banks risking to go bankrupt (Boyd 2000), which implies 
that banks have not been held fully responsible for the risk they have taken on.   
Conflict of interest arises for example when an individual is employed as CEO and 
when he or she has a salary or bonus based on the company’s stock performance. In this 
situation, the CEO might be inclined to boost short term stock price of the company to 
maximize compensation, which could counter the desires of the principal who have a longer 
term perspective.  
According to Jensen (1989), the problem with moral hazard and the potential conflict of 
interest can be reduced or even eliminated in PE owned companies since the ownership 
structure aligns the interest of the agent and the principal. Jensen therefore concludes that PE 
ownership is a superior ownership structure and that it is likely to be a more prevalent type of 
ownership in the future (Jensen, 1989)  
The PE firm’s ability to curtail the agency cost lies in that it makes the agent part-owner 
of the target company. This aligns the interest of the PE firm and the agent, which minimizes 
agency cost. In cases where the agent has not been a part-owner of the business, the PE firm 
has used the board of directors to monitor the executives of the target company in order to 
make sure that they work for the benefit of the PE firm (Fama, Jensen 1983).  
Ever since the PE industry emerged in the early 80s the importance of strong managerial 
incentives have been crucial. Research have been carried out trying to quantify what 
ownership stake is needed in order to incentivize management. Acharya and Kehoe (2008) 
conducted a study of major buyouts in the U.K. and found that the median CEO gets 3 % of 
the equity and the median management get 15 % equity. These results are in the same range 
as a study conducted by Kaplan in 1989 (cited in Strömberg, Kaplan 2008). 
2.3. Financial and governance engineering 
When the PE industry started to evolve in the beginning of the 80s the return from the 
portfolio companies was mainly associated with financial and governance engineering 
(Jensen, 1989). Nowadays, the focus of the PE firm has expanded to include three main areas; 
managerial incentives, leverage and governance of the board (Strömberg and Kaplan 2008). 
First, private equity firms pay close attention to the management incentives of their 
portfolio companies. They give the top management illiquid assets such as stocks and options, 
which was an uncommon provision back in the 80s (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This is 
supposed to incentivize the management by giving them a large upside if the company does 
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well, but at the same time they risk losing a substantial amount of money if the company does 
poorly. 
The second measure taken in order to reap high returns is using leverage. Not only do 
you get an operational leverage which will boost profits during good times, a highly leveraged 
company will also incur large debt repayments which will limit the free cash flow. Having a 
limited cash flow requires the management to be careful when investing the company’s 
capital and this can potentially reduce the “free cash flow problem” (Jensen 1989). The free 
cash flow problem occurs when the management of company has excess cash that they start to 
spend more recklessly, for example on costly project with bleak outlook or expensive 
acquisitions. The latter is a very real concern when management compensation is positively 
correlated with increase in revenue, since the company then might acquire growth beyond the 
point where it is most profitable. 
The third measure focuses on the governance of the board. When a PE firm invests in a 
portfolio company they usually change management and hire key competence from either 
their own firm or their network. According to Acharya and Kehoe (2008), boards of PE 
owned companies are in general smaller, have more informal contact and meet more often 
than publicly owned companies. The boards are also less reluctant to replace poorly 
performing managers; one third of the COOs in the study were replaced during the first 100 
days and two thirds were replaced sometime during the next four years.  
2.4. Operational improvements 
Operational improvements has become the most prominent way to increase the value of a 
target company and on average two thirds of the increase in value comes from operational 
adjustments (Vester, 2011). Operational improvements can be achieved and measured in 
many ways and today PE firms use multiples such as EBITDA/sales, revenue growth, 
sales/employee etc. when measuring operational improvements. Naturally, it varies how the 
management improves these multiplies but among common strategies you find cost cutting, 
mergers and geographical and market expansion. This focus on operational changes can be 
seen in the hiring of several former leading executives by PE firms (Strömberg and Kaplan 
2008). Many companies also have internal and external consulting groups to help them 
increase their operational skills. 
2.5. Financial Implications of Operational Improvements 
Aligning with our thesis question we are limiting our paper to comparing the differences in 
the financial and operational management during a buyout period. Berg and Gottschalg (2003) 
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identified three key areas from where the private equity companies can lever the management 
of the portfolio company in order to create superior returns. These levers of value creation can 
be interpreted in measures for cost cutting and margin improvements, working capital 
management and employee efficiency. By dividing these financial measures into three areas 
we found that profitability, working capital management and employee efficiency are 
exhausting these measures. 
2.5.1. Profitability 
As mentioned in the agency theory section, concentrating ownership, aligning interests 
between management and board and using high leverage can enable general partners to 
increase operation efficiency and therefore overall profitability of the target company. 
2.5.2. Employee Efficiency and Working Capital 
As previously discussed, by increasing the ownership stake of the top management the 
principal-agent problem can be mitigated and employee efficiency increased. Studies have 
shown that PE firms sometimes also implement performance based salary for non-executive 
which should lead to a higher efficiency on all corporate levels (Bacon et. al. 2004). 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) found that a company increased its sales per employee 
metric following a buyout by a PE firm. 
Improving the company’s management of its working capital can be an important 
measure when increasing the value of a firm (Lichtenberg and Siegal 1990). This can be 
achieved by managing the working capital (such as accounts receivable, accounts payable and 
inventory) more efficiently. A decrease in working capital will also free cash, which can be 
used to pay down debt or give dividend to the PE firm. Holthausen (1996) found that target 
companies on average have lower working capital at time of exit than comparable industry 
peers.   
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3. Hypothesis development 
 
In this section we outline the performance hypotheses that we will used to benchmark and 
evaluate private equity owned companies relative to its publicly owned peers.   
Based on the discussion in the previous section regarding PE firms’ ability to reduce agency 
cost by aligning financial incentives in target companies, and thus improving the company’s 
operations, we have outlined a number of hypotheses that we seek to test by gathering 
information from recent buyouts. We decided to apply our hypothesis and conduct our tests 
on target companies being bought by a PE firm between 2004 and 2012, since the holding 
period for PE firms tend to range between 2 and 7 years. This of course implies that there will 
be few companies in our samples that have been bought after 2009. 
We have drawn upon performance measures for PE owned companies used in previous 
studies (Goossens et.al. 2008, Guo et.al. 2011) and filtered for performance measures and 
metrics not deemed relevant for our analysis. From this, we have identified three main areas 
of performance measures for the company, namely: 
(1) Revenue growth 
(2) Profitability  
(3) Efficiency 
These three areas have in turn been subdivided into a number of different metrics that we 
have calculated for the accounting year of entry and then recalculated for the accounting year 
of exit. As previously mentioned, our hypotheses will have the character of an expected 
superior growth, profitability and efficiency for the PE owned company in relation to its 
peers, for reasons outlined in the previous section. 
3.1. Revenue Growth 
Our first hypothesis deals with the revenue growth for the company during the holding period. 
H1: The target company’s revenue grows faster than its peers’ during the holding period 
Revenue growth can either be achieved through organic growth or through acquired growth, 
meaning that the company acquires other companies in order to boost revenue. We make no 
distinction between these two types of growth in our hypothesis. We expect the private equity 
owned company to grow its revenues more than its peers. 
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3.2. Profitability 
We evaluate profitability by measuring the EBITDA margin and the Return on Invested 
Capital (ROIC), which is an approach similar to that of other studies conducting the same 
kind of analysis (Goossens et.al. 2008). We formulate our hypotheses as follows: 
H2: The target company’s ROIC increases more than its peers’ during the holding period 
H3:  The target company’s EBITDA margin increases more than its peers’ during the 
holding period 
We expect the target company to improve the ROIC and the EBITDA margin more than its 
publicly traded peers during the holding period. This assumption follows what has previously 
been discussed, namely that the management of the target company should have strong 
incentives to run the company as profitable as possible. 
3.3 Efficiency and Working Capital 
Similar to our assumptions about profitability, we believe that the target company should 
exhibit higher levels of efficiency during the holding period, due to more stringent corporate 
governance than its publicly traded peers. We evaluate a company’s efficiency by looking at 
its total sales in relation to the number of employees as well as the working capital as a 
percentage of sales (for definition, see section 4.3.3). We believe these two metrics to be good 
measures of efficiency since it tells us something about how many employees and how much 
working capital are required to generate certain revenues. We formulate our efficiency 
hypotheses as follows: 
H4: The target company exhibits a lower net working capital to sales ratio than its peers 
during the holding period 
 H5: The target company exhibits higher sales per employee than its peers during the 
holding period 
Besides describing efficiency, hypothesis H4 also captures an important feature in many 
private equity buyouts, namely, the need to generate high cash flows in order to pay down 
debt assumed by the target company at the time of the buyout. Lower net working capital 
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requirements increase free cash flow
1
, which can be used to pay down the company’s newly 
issued debt.  
                                                     
1 Free Cash Flow is defined as EBIT (1-t) + Depreciation & Amortization – Capital Expenditures - % Change in 
Net working capital. 
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4. Methodology 
In this section we describe the gathering of data preceding our results and the required 
features of each company’s peer group. We also describe metrics used to evaluate the 
performance of private equity owned companies and statistical methods used to gauge the 
reliability of the data. 
Since our results and analysis largely depend on the reliability of the data collected as well as 
the choice of accounting metrics for evaluation, we have been particularly thorough in the 
process and choice of what data and which metrics to use. Our aim has been to use data that 
can be fairly measured (e.g. not distorted by accounting rules) and that has an inherent 
characteristic of comparability. Because of this, we have been prone to use items found as 
early as possible in the income statement (Revenue, EBITDA) and balance sheet items 
reported on an aggregated level rather than a level that is very detailed. An example of this is 
our use of a working capital ratio instead of several ratios including the decomposition of 
working capital (inventory, accounts receivable, accounts payable etc.)  In cases where 
metrics have been negative, and thus hard to interpret, we have chosen to describe and 
analyze the metric in a qualitative way. Although this introduces a more arbitrary evaluation 
of the data than the strict quantitative approach, we still believe that it is a viable and 
meaningful way to make use of data hard to interpret quantitatively. 
4.1 Data Collection 
The first step in the data collection process was to decide which database to use in order to 
obtain information of private equity owned company. Data of this sort is not always easily 
accessible due to the secretive nature of private equity holdings. In addition to this, public 
databases with information about private equity deals are scarce, although this to some extent 
has been offset by a greater disclosure of information from the private equity firms 
themselves following new general guidelines (EVCA 2013).   
We ended up using data provided by Argentum, which is a Norwegian investment 
company focusing on investments in private equity funds (Argentum 2013). The database 
provides information about private equity linked activities, such as buyouts, seed investment, 
mergers and divestments, for the entire Nordic region. Since the focus of this thesis lies on the 
transformation of a private equity owned company during the holding period, we decided to 
only focus on buyout activities. When the information provided by Argentum about a specific 
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buyout was incomplete, we used information from the private equity firm’s website as 
complement. 
We set our initial search to include companies with headquarter in Sweden, the 
transaction to be a buyout (since we wanted to avoid venture capital transactions) made 
during 2004 and 2012, and without any preference regarding sector and type of exit. This 
search yielded 160 hits. Further, we were not interested in buyout transactions that had no 
following exit date since our study focuses on benchmarking the target company to non-
private equity owned peers during the holding period. One could therefore assume that recent 
buyout transactions (e.g. between 2009 and 2012) would seldom be of interest, unless the 
transaction was a so called “secondary buyout”, meaning the target company is already owned 
by a PE firm when sold, since it is unlikely that the private equity company has exited the 
target company before the end of 2012. This refined evaluation left 116 buyout transactions. 
Although the 116 buyout transactions fulfilled the above search criteria, we stilled faced 
a potential problem in that the private equity firm conducting the buyout transaction might not 
be Swedish and thus either (1) merge the company with a foreign company also owned by the 
PE firm and (2) deviate from Swedish generally accepted accounting principles. This could 
potentially inhibit us from obtaining reliable annual reports which in turn could jeopardize our 
results and complicate our benchmarking. We found the annual reports from companies 
bought by foreign private equity firms to be hard to access and therefore we decided to only 
include buyout transactions conducted by Swedish PE firms. Naturally, the aforementioned 
concerns might also apply to Swedish PE firms with portfolio companies abroad, but we 
found that sample to be small and manual adjustments could be made accordingly. Although 
our new search criterion removed a big chunk of the companies in our initial dataset, we still 
saw this necessary and after the refined search we were left with 32 companies.  
Finally, for some companies we were not able to find annual reports for the entry and 
exit years, and we therefore decided to remove these as well. All-in-all, we ended up with 25 
companies that could be properly evaluated. This is about the same number of companies that 
Bruton and Keels (2002) use in a similar study. 
4.2 Comparable Companies 
Since our thesis aims at investigating how a company is expected to change during the time it 
is owned by a PE firm, with respect to certain important metrics, we found it relevant to 
assign each target company a group of comparable companies (referred to as “peer group”). 
We did this since a metric by itself does not give you much information; a certain growth rate 
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can for example be considered high in one industry but low in another. It is possible that an 
industry or the overall economy has had a favorable development during the holding period, 
which would make it hard to gauge the importance of the PE ownership. Also, assigning a 
peer group to evaluate the impact of the PE firm on a target company is an approach taken by 
other similar studies (Bruton 2002, Bergström et.al 2007). 
Each peer company assigned to the target company should function as a viable and 
unbiased benchmark of the target company. In order to achieve this, we started by looking at 
each target company’s SNI code. The SNI code is used to categorize a company based on the 
type of industry it is mainly operating within. This approach resembles other researchers’ 
(Bergström 2007 et.al.) with the difference being that they have used NACE codes instead, 
which is a standardized classification system for European companies. Since we are only 
interested in comparable companies operating in Sweden, we considered SNI to be more 
appropriate than NACE. In addition to using SNI in order to elect peer companies, we also 
added the following criteria for each peer: 
(1) Not owned by another PE firm 
(2) Revenue between 15 % and 300 % of that of the target company the year of exit 
(3) Annual report available at both the entry and exit year of the target company 
Both criteria (1) and (3) are intuitive to include since they are a matter of comparability and 
data access, respectively. Criterion (2) was chosen in order to avoid comparing the target 
company with a company of very different size, since this could mean that either company 
benefit from substantial economies of scale. Damodaran (2007) states that there is a scale 
effect in ROIC, implying that the ROIC for a company will be decreasing as the company 
grows bigger. Since we wanted to avoid this potential pitfall in our comparison between the 
target company and the peer company, we initially decided that the turnover should be 
between 30 and 200 % of that of the target company. However, in order to get a sufficient 
number of peers (3) we had to stretch this criterion to include companies with a turnover 
between 15 and 300 % instead. 
4.3 Performance Measures 
In order to evaluate changes in the target company following the buyout by the PE firm, we 
have chosen a number of metrics that will be calculated at the entry year and then recalculated 
at the exit year. We have focused and chosen metrics/ratios based on a couple of conditions, 
namely: 
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(1) The metric should be hard to distort by accounting measures 
(2) The metric should be independent of tax rate and financial structure of the company 
(3) The metric should potentially be interesting for someone conducting buyouts 
(4) The metric should try to capture operating changes 
The first and second condition can be satisfied by choosing items in the income statement as 
close to revenue as possible. This limits the PE firm’s leeway to lower taxable income by 
using innovative financial structures. Two good measures to use for this purpose are EBITDA 
and EBIT. For the third and fourth condition we have chosen to focus on efficiency by using 
input-output related measures (such as profitability and changes in sales). 
4.3.1 Change in revenue 
Our first measure of the changes occurring in the target company during the entry and exit 
year is change in revenue. We deem this relevant for purpose of analysis since it tells us 
something about growth in the target company’s revenue during the holding period. Growth 
can be achieved either through growing organically, or through acquiring other companies to 
create a bigger entity with higher revenues. The latter strategy is widely used within private 
equity and is sometimes referred to as “bolt on acquisition” or “buy and build acquisition”. 
We pay no particular interest in whether the growth in the target company’s revenue is 
achieved organically or through acquisition in this thesis. 
4.3.2 Profitability measures 
We are measuring changes in profitability by using two different metrics that complement 
each other in a way that we found appropriate. The first metric we use when measuring 
changes in profitability is Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), which is a measure of how 
much the company generate in profits in relation to its invested capital (Damodaran, 2007). 
The ROIC measure is not uniform between different scholars and can be calculated either on a 
pre-tax or post-tax basis (Damodaran, 2007). However, since we stated in our general 
principles that changes in tax rate should not affect our metrics, we decided to go with 
Damodarans’s pre-tax definition of ROIC. We calculate ROIC as follows: 
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The reason for subtracting cash from current assets is because cash contributes with interest 
income to the Earnings Before Interest (EBT), and if we were to include this in our ROIC 
measure, we would be double counting. Also, we do not want to include effects of different 
financial structures in our profitability measure.  
We intuitively see that this profitability measure can become negative if either (1) EBIT 
is negative, in which case the company is not profitable, or if (2) Invested Capital is negative, 
which can occur if the company either has a small asset base, a lot of cash or high levels of 
current liabilities. Since a negative ROIC is hard to interpret – it is not necessarily a bad thing 
to have a negative ROIC if it is the denominator that is negative – we also use the metric 
EBITDA/Sales as a measure of profitability. This metric is very straight forward to calculate 
and is sometimes referred to as “gross profit” in the income statement. One calculates the 
EBITDA margin as: 
       % = EBITDA/Sales 
We believe that the two measures presented above give a fair indication of a company’s 
profitability. 
4.3.3 Efficiency measures and Working Capital 
When measuring how efficient the company is when using its resources, we use two different 
metrics; sales per employee and working capital as a percentage of sales. These two metrics 
are calculated as follows: 
 
                   
           
                         
 
 
                          
                                       
           
 
 
We use sales per employee as a straight forward measure of how much revenue each 
employee at the company generates. For the working capital measure, expressed as a 
percentage of sales, we are interested in knowing how much input is needed to get a certain 
output (revenue). Since an efficient organization will require lower levels of working capital 
to generate a certain amount of revenue than an inefficient organization, this is a good 
measure of how well the company manages its working capital. The working capital metric is 
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widely within used in private equity (Ashraf, 2012) since increased efficiency, in terms of 
lower working capital requirements, frees capital that can be used to for example pay down 
debt or make dividend payments. 
4.4 Accounting Data 
We have gathered accounting data mainly using the database Retriever, which includes annual 
reports for most Swedish companies. When necessary, we have used the database Orbis or the 
company’s own website as complements when the data provided by Retriever has not been 
sufficient. All the data has been manually inputted in an excel spreadsheet, which has enabled 
us to be consistent when it comes to using accounting values such as net working capital and 
operating income as well as consistent when calculating ROIC. This has been done both for 
the target companies and for the peer group. In cases where recent annual reports have not 
been available, we have adjusted the exit year to the last year where the company’s annual 
report can be found. Although this potentially could change our result somewhat in 
comparison to the actual outcome (if for example the exit year would look profoundly 
different from the preceding year), we do not deem it has since the adjustment only had to be 
made three times. All the target companies and the companies included in the peer group can 
be found in Appendix A. 
4.5 Statistical Measures 
Since our aim in this thesis is to evaluate the impact of PE ownership on the target company 
relative to its peers, we found it most reasonable to measure changes in our metrics between 
the year of entry and the year of exit and then compare them. Thus, we get the difference 
between entry and exit, which we will refer to as delta (Δ). Since our peer groups include 
more than one company, we have decided to use the median for our peer companies. We 
believe that the median gives a better measure then the mean, since the mean can easily be 
distorted by huge outliers. Using revenue growth as an example, our statistical measures for 
the target company looks as follows: 
           
             
             
             
                         
This is compared to the same metric of the target company’s peers group, as follows:  
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This is done for the metrics analyzed in this thesis, i.e. Sales, Working Capital/Sales, ROIC, 
Sales/Number of Employees and EBITDA/Sales. 
4.5.1 Significance Measure 
In order to measure and evaluate the significance of our data (at the 1, 5 and 10 % level), we 
have chosen to perform both a student t-test and a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. The student t-
test is a common test to use when determining whether or not two data sets are significantly 
different from one another. The student t-test assumes normal distribution. Since our sample 
size is relatively small (25 target companies with 25 peer groups) the student t-test might not 
be reliable (Newbold, 2006) and for this reason we have also chosen to perform a Wilcoxon  
Signed Rank Test. This test can be applied on smaller samples (N < 30) and is a distribution 
free test based on ranks that can be used when the normality assumption is not certain 
(Newbold, 2006). In our results we will put emphasis on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
since we regarded this test to be more relevant then the student t-test due to the potential 
shortcoming mentioned above.  
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5. Results and analysis 
Here we discuss the data and the results obtained from our sample companies. We evaluate 
our different hypotheses and compare our results with previous empirical research that has 
been done on the subject.  
When analyzing and discussing the results obtained from our data sample, we have decided to 
evaluate the results by using segmentation similar to that of Berg and Gottschalg (2003) in 
their investigation of potential levers of value generation. This is also the segmentation used 
throughout this paper and consists of an evaluation of revenue growth, profitability, working 
capital and employee efficiency. 
5.1 Revenue Growth 
Since each target company’s size of revenue at the entry year is of little importance for our 
analysis, we make no effort to compare these figures with the size of revenue for the peer 
group. During the holding period, the median revenue for the target companies increases by 
66,6 % (we pay little attention to the average revenue growth since this figure is affected by a 
big outlier) compared to a median increase of 8,3 % for the peer group. Our first hypothesis 
H1 stated that we expected the revenue growth to be higher for target companies, which 
seems to be the case when evaluating our data. As discussed in the theory and methodology 
section, we make no adjustment for acquired growth and the big difference between the 
revenue growth between the target companies and the peer group could probably be attributed 
to the “bolt on” acquisition strategy discussed in section 4.3.1. 
Exhibit 1 shows the average and median revenue at the year of entry and the year of exit as well as the 
percentage change (Δbuyout) during the holding period. 
Revenue target Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 1 153 447 1 220 063 5,8% 
Median 226 603 377 589 66,6% 
St dev. 2 939 827 2 334 028 -20,6% 
 
Revenue peers Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 579 588 684 941 18,2% 
Median 237 471 257 258 8,3% 
St dev. 824 628 936 997 13,6% 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
According to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (below), the difference in revenue growth is 
significant at a 10 % significance level while the t-test was insignificant. 
Metric Z value Significance level 
Δ Revenue % 1,46 10% 
5.2. Profitability 
As described in the hypotheses section, we have used changes in ROIC and EBITDA/Sales as 
proxies for profitability changes during the holding period. A statistically significant 
difference in these measures between the target company and its peer group would indicate 
that profitability changes are related to the ownership structure of a company.    
5.2.1 Change in ROIC 
At the entry year where the target company was acquired, it had a median ROIC of 17,8 % 
and an average ROIC of 29,9 %. This compares to the median ROIC of 23,8 % and an 
average of 32,9 % for the peer group (excluding peer company HemoCue). From this, we can 
conclude that target companies seem to have a lower initial ROIC compared to its peers. From 
the perspective of the PE firm, this might be an indication that there are opportunities for 
profitability improvements in the target company. 
Exhibit 2 shows the average and median ROIC in percentage at the year of entry and the year of exit as well as 
the change (Δbuyout) during the holding period. 
ROIC target Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 29,9% 38,4% 8,6% 
Median 17,8% 29,4% 11,6% 
St dev. 36,8% 42,1% 5,3% 
 
ROIC peers Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 32,9% 28,8% -4,1% 
Median 23,8% 19,6% -4,2% 
St dev. 35,5% 37,7% 2,2% 
 
Our hypotheses H2 stated that we expected the increase in ROIC for the target company to be 
higher than the increase of its non-PE owned peers. Reading from the tables, this seems to be 
25 
 
true since the median change in ROIC during the holding period for the buyout company is 12 
%, compared to a decrease of 4,2 % for its peers. This difference in ROIC development is 
statistically significant at the 10 % level according to both the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
(below) and the t-test. 
Metric Z value Significance level 
Δ ROIC % 1,42 10% 
 
5.2.2. Change in EBITDA/Sales 
The entry period figure shows that PE firms buy companies with a higher EBITDA margin, 
median 12,0 % and average 15,7 %, compared to the peer group where the median EBITDA 
margin is 8,2 % and the average 9,9 %.  Our hypothesis H3 states that we expect the EBITDA 
margin to increase more for a PE owned company than for its peers during the holding period. 
The data shows a positive median change of 0,5 % (average 1,5 %) for the target companies, 
compared with a negative median change at -1,4 % (average -0,9 %) for the peer group which 
indicates that our hypothesis was correct. 
Exhibit 3 shows the average and median EBITDA margin in percentage at the year of entry and the year of exit 
as well as the change (Δbuyout) during the holding period. 
EBITDA % target Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 15,7% 17,1% 1,5% 
Median 12,0% 12,5% 0,5% 
St dev. 14,8% 14,2% -0,6% 
 
 
EBITDA % peers Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 9,9% 9,0% -0,9% 
Median 8,2% 6,8% -1,4% 
St dev. 8,6% 8,5% -0,1% 
 
This development is significant at the 10 % level according both to the Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test (below) and for the t-test. 
Metric Z value Significance level 
Δ EBITDA % 1,29 10% 
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5.2.3 Analysis – Profitability 
We have used ROIC and EBITDA margin as our profitability measures and our results are in 
line with previous similar studies (Bergström et al. 2007, Andersson & Gilstring 2009). Older 
studies have been conducted on the same topic, but we have only considered more recent 
studies due to changes in the PE industry. The increase in profitability seems to be one of the 
most important areas to improve for PE companies and referring to our theory section, parts 
of the increased profitability could potentially be contributed to the reduced agency cost. This 
view is supported by studies on post buyout performance (Sirmon et.al. 2003), where they 
discuss strategic entrepreneurial advantages that disappears following the departure of the PE 
firm. 
5.2. Change in Working Capital 
We have calculated net working capital (NWC) over sales during the holding period to 
determine how well the target company manages its working capital. At the entry year there 
was no substantial different between the target companies and the peer group. The target 
companies had a median ratio of 6,1 % working capital to sales at the entry year (average 10 
%) while the corresponding peer group had a median of 7,0 % (9,7 % average). Our 
hypothesis H4 stated that we expected the target company to decrease the NWC/Sales ratio, 
but our data shows no such development.  The median change in NWC/Sales ratio for the 
target company was an increase of 1,0 % (average 3,1 %) while the median ratio for the peer 
group increased by 0,2 % (average -2,2 %). 
Exhibit 4 shows the average and median NWC/Sales in percentage at the year of entry and the year of exit as 
well as the change (Δbuyout) during the holding period. 
NWC/Sales target Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 10,0% 13,2% 3,1% 
Median 6,1% 7,1% 1,0% 
St dev. 15,2% 23,6% 8,4% 
 
NWC/Sales peers Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 9,7% 7,5% -2,2% 
Median 7,0% 7,3% 0,2% 
St dev. 18,1% 13,0% -5,1% 
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This surprise is somewhat surprising since it indicated that the peer group manages it working 
capital more efficient than the target company. However, our data showed to not be 
significant according to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (below) and should therefore be 
carefully interpreted. The t-test was also insignificant. 
Metric Z value Significance level 
Δ NWC/Sales % -0,9 Not significant 
5.2.1. Analysis - Working Capital 
The non-significant difference of the working capital management between the target 
companies and the peer group is somewhat surprising, although our result has been found in 
other similar studies as well (Lundgren & Norberg 2006). As proposed in the hypothesis 
section, it should be in the PE firm’s interest to reduce the working capital in order to free 
cash, which can be used to pay down debt incurred at the leveraged buyout. However, if we 
go back in time, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) found that working capital requirements were 
in fact lower in PE owned companies than in non-PE owned companies. One can therefore 
speculate that there might have been a shift in non-PE owned companies’ working capital 
management, leading to a more efficient use of their resources which has eliminated the 
efficiency gap enjoyed by companies owned by a PE firm.  
5.3. Change in Employee Efficiency 
In order to evaluate if the target company is more efficient when it comes to employee 
management we looked at the sales/employee ratio and how it changed during the holding 
period. The entry period shows that there is only a small difference in the sales/employee 
ratio, with a median for the target companies of 4 030 000 SEK versus a median of 4 134 000 
SEK for the peer group.  Our hypothesis H5 states that we expect the target company to 
increase its sales/employee ratio more than the peer group during the holding period. 
However, our results do not support that notion.  The median change in sales per employee 
for the target companies is an increase of 27,2 % (average 1,3 %) against an increase of 31,6 
% (7,6 %) for the peer group. This shows that the peer group outperforms the target 
companies when it comes to increasing sales per employee. 
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Exhibit 5 shows the average and median Sales/Employee at the year of entry and the year of exit as well as the 
change (Δbuyout) during the holding period. 
Sales/Employee 
target Entry Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 4030 4082 1,3% 
Median 2210 2811 27,2% 
St dev. 3804 3516 -7,6% 
 
Sales/Employee 
peers Entry  Exit Δ Buyout 
Average 4134 4448 7,6% 
Median 2144 2822 31,6% 
St dev. 6714 6587 -1,9% 
 
Our results are significant at the 5 % level according to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
(below) but insignificant for the t-test. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Analysis - Employee Efficiency 
As with the working capital management, it should be in the interest of the PE firm to 
increase the sales per employee. The reductions of agency cost by aligning incentives of the 
management, the owner and the staff would imply a more efficient use of human resources 
and therefore higher return per employee. Some previous studies have found an increase of 
sales per employee for target companies during the holding period (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 
1990) whereas newer studies measuring sales per employee have only found a slight increase 
(Molander et.al. 2011). Some newer studies mentioned previously in this report have not 
measured sales per employee and it is therefore somewhat unclear if this represents a true 
change.  
  
Metric Z value Significance level 
Δ Sales/Employee % 1,65 5% 
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6. Conclusion 
Our aim with this thesis was to answer the question of how private equity owned companies 
develop in terms of certain financial metrics compared to comparable companies not owned 
by a private equity firm. By doing this, one could argue that we simultaneously evaluated the 
impact of private equity ownership as a whole. From the hypotheses we stated regarding the 
target company’s growth, profitability and employee efficiency, we have summarized our 
results in the table below. 
Hypothesis Support Significance 
H1: Revenue grows faster than its peers’  Yes 10% 
H2: ROIC increases more than its peers’ Yes 10% 
H3: EBITDA margin increases more than its peers’  Yes 10% 
H4: Exhibits a lower net working capital to sales ratio than its peers No - 
H5: Exhibits higher sales per employee than its peers No 5% 
As we can see, our results are not unanimous. It seems to be true that profitability, in our 
sample defined as ROIC and EBITDA margin, is superior for the private equity owned 
companies. This might be a direct result of the theoretical approaches of superior profitability 
presented throughout this thesis (reduced agency cost, less excess cash etc.) but could also be 
a result of factors we have overseen. The target companies increase their revenue faster than 
the peer group, which as discussed earlier could be due to a “bolt-on” strategy pursued by the 
target company, where it boosts its revenues by acquiring other companies. 
Surprisingly, the target companies do not exhibit higher efficiency in regards of higher 
sales per employee nor in terms of more efficiency working capital management. This is 
surprising since one would think that the alignment of interest between owners, managers and 
staff would lead to a more efficient use of time and resources. When comparing older studies 
with newer, we notice that results found in older studies indicating a superior efficiency for 
PE owned companies seems to have vanished. It is hard to guess if this represents a true 
change, indicating efficiency convergence between PE owned companies and non-PE owned 
companies, or if observed change is non-significant.   
6.1 Recommendations for further research 
In this thesis we have discussed theoretical approaches behind the alleged superiority of 
private equity ownership as well as quantitatively examined it. Due to the nature of this paper 
and associated time constraints, more thorough and comprehensive further research could 
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expand the comparison made in this thesis by adding more financial metrics on a larger 
sample. This could potentially outline metrics that bear higher interpretation value but that is 
neglected in this or other similar research. One could also elaborate with qualitatively analysis 
in order to detect qualitatively patterns that affect financial metrics within a certain industry. 
Finally, it would be of great interest to look at how the benefits of private equity ownership 
have changed from the 80s and 90s compared to today. Some results in earlier papers as well 
as in ours suggest that there might have occurred some level of convergence between PE 
owned companies and non-PE owned companies, especially when looking at efficiency.   
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Appendix 
Target company in bold with entry and exit year, peer companies listed below target. 
 
Fund Manager Portfolio Company Buyout Exit 
Accent Crem International 2007 2011 
 
Franke Futurum AB 
  
 
Tylö AB 
  
 
Whirlpool AB 
  Accent Jetpak 2006 2011 
 
NTEX 
  
 
Alltransport Östergötland AB 
  
 
TNT Sverige 
  Accent INR 2007 2010 
 
Westcoast Windows 
  
 
Kosta Glasproduktion 
  
 
Glasma AB 
  Accent Grycksbo 2006 2009 
 
Munksjö AB 
  
 
Rottneros 
  
 
RexCell Tissue & Airlaid 
  Accent Annas Pepparkakor 2005 2008 
 
Dahls Bageri AB 
  
 
Hägges Finbageri AB 
  
 
Godbiten Konditori AB 
  Accent Vaasan (Nordic Bake-off) 2005 2006 
 
Farina AB 
  
 
Frebaco Kvarn AB 
  
 
Abdon Finax AB 
  Accent Aveva (Tribon Solutions) 2002 2005 
 
XDIN 
  
 
Valtech 
  
 
Tibco Software 
  Accent Equity Wernersson Ost AB 2004 2007 
 
Ockelbo Ost AB 
  
 
Lindahls Mejeriprodukter AB 
  
 
Di Luca & Di Luca Aktiebolag 
  Credelity Capital Smoke free system 2007 2011 
 
Cembrit 
  
 
AB Tradeca 
  
 
Paroc Panel Systems 
  EQT Lundhags 2006 2011 
 
Fjällräven 
  
 
Röhnisch Sportswear AB 
  
 
Bauer Hockey 
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EQT/Investor Gambro 2005 2011 
 
St Jude Medical Systems AB 
  
 
Dentsply IH AB 
  
 
Maquet Critical Care 
  EQT HemoCue Aktiebolag 2000 2007 
 
Foss Analytical AB 
  
 
Trimble AB 
  
 
Car-O-Liner Aktiebolag 
  Litorina Coromatic 2007 2011 
 
Teleca AB 
  
 
Chotebor AB 
  
 
Leröy AB 
  Litorina Pahlen 2007 2011 
 
Seibu Giken DST AB 
  
 
Setrab AB 
  
 
Ventur Tekniska AB 
  Litorina Q-Matic 2004 2007 
 
Carbex AB 
  
 
Mobitec 
  
 
GEMS PET Systems AB 
  Nordic Capital Atos 2005 2011 
 
Liko AB 
  
 
TeamOlmed Nord AB 
  
 
Getinge Sterilization AB 
  Nordic Capital Kappahl 2004 2006 
 
Stadium AB 
  
 
Gekås AB 
  
 
RNB Retail and Brands 
  Procuritas Däkia 2009 2011 
 
Vianor AB 
  
 
Malmfältens Gummi AB 
  
 
Euromaster AB 
  Ratos Anticimex Holding  AB 2006 2011 
 
ISS Facility Services Ab 
  
 
Sodexo AB 
  
 
Allianceplus AB 
  Ratos Camfil 2000 2010 
 
BT Products AB 
  
 
Swegon AB 
  
 
Parker Hannifin AB 
  Ratos Haglöf Holding 2001 2010 
 
Team Sportia AB 
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STIGA Sports AB 
  
 
Fjällräven AB 
  Segulah Skandinavisk Kommunalteknik 2008 2011 
 
GPA Flowsystem AB 
  
 
KWH Pipe Sverige AB 
  
 
Hugo Carping 
  Segulah Exotic Snacks 2008 2011 
 
Sam & Son Grossist 
  
 
Green Sales Distribution 
  
 
ER-t Godis AB 
  Valedo Aspen 2007 2010 
 
PEN Interiör AB 
  
 
Ekenäs Design AB 
  
 
Swedese Möbler AB 
  Valedo Solhagaby 2007 2010 
 
Brizad Behandlingskonsult AB 
  
 
Schedevi Psykiatri AB 
  
 
AB Vårljus 
   
